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Immunity v. Universal Jurisdiction: The Yerodia
Ndombasi Decision of the International Court of Justice
Alberto.Luis Zuppi"
On 14 February 2002 the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
delivered its decision in the dispute between the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the Kingdom of Belgium regarding a Minister of
Foreign Affairs' immunity from arrest.' The controversy was
originated by issuing and internationally circulating a Belgian arrest
writ against the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yerodia
Ndombasi. He was accused of broadcasting speeches inciting racial
hatred against Tutsi residents in the Congo. Those speeches resulted
in fierce manhunts which led to widespread slaughtering of Tutsis.
Although such behavior appeared to be a purely internal affair, it was
considered to be a crime under Belgian domestic law in force at that
time. 2
The Congolese claim before the international Tribunal essentially
maintained that the Belgian warrant was issued in violation of a
recognized international law ruling granting absolute immunity to a
Minister for Foreign Affairs as accepted by The Hague Tribunal. Most
interestingly, the I.C.J. decision touched tangentially upon the purest
form of universal jurisdiction but resolved against its recognition as a
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1. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2000 I.C.J. 235 (Dec. 13, 2000), available at
www.icj-cij.org. (last visited Mar. 23, 2003). See 4 I.L.M. 536 (2002).
2. The arrest warrant was issued by an investigating judge in Brussels who
invoked a Belgian 1993 law, amended in 1999, relating to serious violations of
international law. After the Yerodia Ndombasi decision of the I.C.J. and being this
paper on print the Belgian Law was amended again in April 2003. This last
amendment concerned several clauses of the former law and have been criticized
by many human rights groups. It was seen as downsizing Belgian prior universal
jurisdication wide model to just those cases where the suspected party is Belgian,
or when the crime was committed in Belgium, or if the suspected party is in
Belgium, or if the victim has lived in Belgium for a minimum of three years. In
those situations, if the Federal Prosecutor cases starts a proceeding against the
related suspect, the case can be brought forward. See 'Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin
1993 relative i la rpression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire et
l'article 144ter du Code Judiciaire", Montieur Belge, 5 July 2003 available at
<http://www.justfgov.be/cgi/article-body.pl?numac=2003009412&caller=list&rticle
lang...> See English translation in 42 I.L.M. 749 (2003). On August 1, 2003 the
Belgian Parliament repealed the law. Today Belgian courts will only have jurisdiction
over international crimes if the accused or ifthe victim were Belgian or had their primary
residence in Belgium for at least three years at the time the crimes were committed. See
Human Rights Watch site available at http://hrwatch.org (last visited Aug. 15, 2003).
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current international customary rule. Both conclusions have worried
many human rights organizations3 and the concerns were further
aggravated by the recent decision of the Brussels Chambre d' Appel.
Specifically, the Brussels Court declared that Belgianjurisdiction may
only be recognized regarding crimes perpetrated outside Belgium
when the accused is in Belgian territory. On April 16, 2002 the
Brussel's Chamber of Appeals annulled the prosecutions involved in
the Yerodia case. The Chamber decision sustained that the related
Belgian law was applicable only when the suspect physically were in
Belgian territory. This decision was appealed by the civil parties into
the Cour de Cassation,4 which on November 20, 2002 abrogated the
former judgment, returning the case to the Brussel's Chamber of
Appeals who will finally decide with a new judges composition.
This paper evaluates the I.C.J.'s conclusions, confronting them
with current international law and analyzing the impact produced. In
order to do this, I will first recall the underlying principles for the
Belgian arrest warrant and assess the Congolese allegations on official
immunity. Thereafter, I will examine the Court's opinion regarding
immunity and its consideration ofuniversal jurisdiction, comparing its
conclusions with international case law and current literature.
Although the decision was undoubtedly a setback for the more
progressive position on this topic, and reversed some questions
understood as already decided by the Pinochet case,5 the I.C.J. ruling
needs to be understood within its true framework without magnifying
its impact. While reading this paper, the reader should keep the
following ideai in mind. In domestic law, we establish the rules of
spatial application of criminal law by verifying its geographic
implementation. A State usually exercises its criminal competence
over crimes committed within its frontiers or, by applying the so called
"personality principle," recognizes its jurisdiction because either the
perpetrator or the victim is a citizen of that State (active or passive
personality principle). A State may also apply its law in the case of a
crime committed in another country, when the crime affects its vital
interest (protective principle). Finally, every State has jurisdiction in
the cases of some heinous crimes, wherever the crime was committed,
3. Compare the positions ofAmnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
World Against Torture Organization in their respective websites, available at
http://www.amnestyinternational.be/doc/article.php3?idarticle= 184,
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/1 I/world-court.htmandhttp://www.omct.org/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
4. See chronology of proceedings available at
http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Belgique/Yerodia.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2003).
5. Compare with Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet




or whatever the nationality of its perpetrator or its victim. This
principle of universal jurisdiction does not require any bond or tie
between its perpetrator and the forum State.6
Secondly, when in this paper reference is made to immunity, I am
speaking ofjurisdictional immunity, or the impossibility of submitting
a foreign sovereign to the courts of another State without the former
State's acquiescence. Traditionally, the principle of immunity was
established in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon case.7 There,
Justice Marshall declared the absolute immunity of a foreign
sovereign, installing a precedent in case law legal tradition which
remained operative until the second half of the past century. The
sovereign was immune and untouchable: par in parem non habet
imperium. More than a century later, by the so called "Tate Letter,"
the U.S. Government accepted the "restrictive immunity" theory
differentiating between acts iure imperii and iure gestionis, and
recognized immunity only for the former.'
I. THE BELGIAN ARREST WARRANT
On 11 April 2000 Judge Damien Vandermeersch issued
international arrest warrant number 40/95/BR30.9937/99, 9 accussing
Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi of crimes against the Belgian Law of
1993. The warrant was issued in a case which also investigated former
Congolese President Laurent-Desir6 Kabila, former Minister of
Information Didier Mumengi and former Communication Counselor
Dominique Sakombi. The case was initially filed by fourteen
civilians, five of them Belgian citizens but all with residence in
Belgium. Eight of them additionally initiated a civil claim for damages
because of their Tutsi ethnic identity. The case motivated the Kings
Procurator to request a judicial investigation in accordance with
Belgian criminal procedure. Such antecedents oblige us to disregard
the Congolese comments that the case was purely the initiative of a
Belgian judge.
It can be ascertained that Laurent-Desir6 Kabila led a coalition of
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi troops to overthrow president Mobutu
in 1997. In the aftermath of these July 1998 events, Kabila ordered
withdrawal of the coalition troops from the Congolese territory. His
6. Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal
Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 153, 153-72, 171 (Autumn 1996).
7. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116(1812).
8. See generally, Christoph H. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent
Developments (1988).
9. The arrest warrant is transcribed in 79 Revue de Droit Penal et de
Criminologie 278 (1999).
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order, however, was disregarded and a part of the Congolese army
itself revolted in alliance with the coalition troops. In the conflict that
followed, President Kabila and Yerodia Ndombasi made incendiary
speeches against the Tutsis with the purpose of impelling the mob to
impede the rebels occupying strategic places. The arrest warrant
specifically recalls that between August 4th and 27th, 1998, Yerodia
Abdoulaye Ndombasi, who was President Kabila's Private Secretary
and Head of Cabinet, had broadcasted speeches inciting racial hatred,
resulting in the Tutsi massacres.
The warrant asserted that Yerodia Ndombasi was fully aware of
the consequences of his speeches and rather than discourage the
killings, he willfully sought to provoke them through dragnet
operations, arbitrary arrests and trials. The warrant further asserted
that he neglectfully omitted any action to prevent these results.
Yerodia Ndombasi was charged with being the perpetrator or co-
perpetrator of:
Crimes under international law constituting grave breaches,
causing harm by act or omission to persons and property
protected by the Conventions signed at Geneva on 12 August
1949 and by Additional Protocols I and II to those Conventions
(Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Law of 16 June 1993, as
amended by the 10 February 1999 Law concerning the
punishment of serious violations of international humanitarian
law);
Crimes against humanity (Article 1, paragraph 2, of 16
June 1993 Law, as amended by the Law of 10 February 1999
concerning the punishment of serious violations of
international humanitarian law).' °
II. THE BELGIAN LAW
The Belgian law justifying the arrest warrant was sanctioned on 16
June 1993. Originally titled as relating to the repression of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their
Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977,11 the law was issued in pursuit of the
Conventions' common duty 2 obliging each State to:
Undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering
10. Id.
11. Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,75 U.N.T.S. 135 and 75
U.N.T.S. 287. See 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 and 125 U.T.N.S. 609 for Protocols I and II,
in force since 1977.
12. See identical text for all four Conventions in art. 49(I), art. 50(11), art.
129(111) and art. 146(IV) respectively.
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to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article. 3
As a consequence of debate provoked by Pinochet in Britain and
the introduction of some claims in Belgium against the former Chilean
head of State, the Law was modified on 10 February 1999. Its title
was also changed to the more general "Law related to the punishment
of grave breaches of international humanitarian law."' 4 The new text
included, in addition to the offences already set forth in the former text
by the Geneva Conventions, those crimes which constitute genocide
under the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948," and the description of
crimes against humanity given in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. 6
Additionally, Article 5 provides that "[i]mmunity attaching to the
official status of a person, shall not prevent the application of the
present Law."' 7
This paragraph propelled the warrant against Yerodia Ndombasi,
who was an incumbent and prominent member of the Congolese
government both at the time his racist speeches were broadcast and
also at the time the warrant was issued. Yerodia Ndomasi held a
ministerial position until a few months after the claim before the I.C.J.
was submitted.
Finally, we need to recall that an 18 July 2001 Law'8 modified
article l2bis of the 17 April 1878 Law that related to the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Part. The 18 July 2001 law
recognizes Belgian jurisdiction in all cases where an international
treaty extends the States Party's jurisdiction. Judge Vandermeersch
held that such a general reference was introduced to Belgian
legislation in order to avoid having to adapt the law every time the
country subscribes a Convention containing such obligations. 9
13. Id.
14. Loi relative i la repression des violations graves du droit international
humanitaire, available at http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/DJ/Loibelge2.htm
(last visited March 23, 1999).
15. Adopted by Resolution 260 A (III) United Nations General Assembly, on
force since Jan. 12 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
16. See art. 7 in United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,. 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
17. Id., art. 5.
18. Moniteur Beige, 1 Sept. 2001.
19. I wish to thank his facilitating some material for this paper such as La
compdtence universelle en droit beige, in Poursuites Penales et Extraterritorialiti,
Union Belgo-Luxembourgeoise de Droit Penal, la Charte, Brussels (B), 39-89,45
(2002).
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III. IMMUNITY FROM EXTRADITION
At the moment the warrant was issued on 11 April 2000 Mr.
Yerodia had already assumed a position as Foreign Minister and was
to remain in this position until November 2000. After a Ministerial
reshuffle he was appointed Minister of Education serving in this office
from November 2000 until April 2001. However, when the first
hearings before the I.C.J. took place Yerodia Ndombasi no longer
occupied any ministerial position. On 12 September 2001, the
National Office ofINTERPOL in Belgium, requested the 1NTERPOL
Secretary General in Lyon, to issue a "red notice" for Yerodia
Ndombasi. Such notices refer to persons to whom an arrest is required
for extradition.
When the Congo deposited its application instituting proceedings
against Belgium, it contended that the international arrest warrant
violated the principle of sovereign immunity between States. That
principle had been recognized by Court jurisprudence and laid down
in Article 2 paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter, as well as Article 41
paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.2'
However, when the Congo made its submission, its Memorial reduced
all arguments to a violation of customary international law concerning
the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal proceedings for
incumbent foreign ministers. This reduction was understandable
because all those conventional provisions provide some guidance on
specific aspects but do not contain any explicit provision regarding the
immunities enjoyed by foreign ministers. At the most they refer to the
situation of officers on "special missions" in the receiving State.
The Court was adamant on this point, concluding that a current
Minister of Foreign Affairs while abroad enjoys full immunity and
inviolability from criminal jurisdiction. But the Court's decision
involved the situation of a standing minister. Belgium repeatedly
insisted that the case on hand lost its juridical significance because
Yerodia Ndombasi was no longer in office. Belgium presumed that
such a circumstance worked as a clause rebus sic stantibus
fundamentally changing the prior situation. This line of argument was
rejected by the Court which concluded "that at the time that it was
seized of the case it has jurisdiction to deal with it and, that it still has
such jurisdiction." 21
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO TOTAL IMMUNITY
The Court nonetheless affirmed that the immunity from
jurisdiction enjoyed by current foreign ministers does not mean




impunity. The Court admitted that in certain circumstances the
following exceptions could apply:
(a) in the case when such person is tried in his/her own
country;
(b) when the represented State waives his/her immunity;
(c) when a State invoking jurisdiction arrests a former
minister for acts committed prior or subsequent to the
ministerial position, or acts committed in a private
capacity during that position; and
(d) when subjected to criminal proceedings by a recognized
international criminal tribunal.22
The I.C.J. decision did not, however, find mandatory universal
jurisdiction when the requested person is out of bounds for the State
wishing to exercise jurisdiction. It recognized jurisdiction when
there was a waiver, as well as in those cases where jurisdiction is
effectively accepted. This could be the case of a State arresting the
requested person in its territory or based on an arrest warrant by one
of the recognized international criminal tribunals. In consequence,
being (a) and (b) are very unlikely, and (c) requires a point of contact
as we will see, the only plain recognition of a pure universal
jurisdiction, in the way Belgium has admitted, remains only for the
internationgil criminal tribunals.
The language used for exception (c) prompts some questions. It
accepts the waiver of immunity after a person ceases to hold his/her
office. But afterward the text adverts: ".... [p]rovided that it has
jurisdiction under international law"2 3 a State may prosecute the
former officer ".... in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent
to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed
during that period of office in a private capacity."24 If a former
minister were to be detained by a country prosecuting him or her, or
obtained his or her extradition from another State, would such
jurisdiction be understood to be in accordance with international
law? Perhaps the question will be clearer with an example: If
Pinochet were detained in London because the U.K. recognized the
Spanish right to request his extradition, would the jurisdiction
obtained by Spain be understood to be in accordance with
international law? Moreover, would it be lawful for him to be
prosecuted for acts committed prior or subsequent to his time in
office or for acts perpetrated during such time but in a private
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these questions. The significance of "private capacity" and the full
meaning of "being in accordance with international law."
If a State, as such, cannot commit any crime as understood during
the discussions of article 19 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility of the International Law Commission, then a crime
perpetrated by one of its officers must always be done in a private
capacity. 5 On the other hand, the vague and open reference about
obtaining jurisdiction in accordance with international law, leaves
open a question upon the lawfulness of a specific capture. Consider
for instance the doctrine of male captus bene detentus as it was
developed in United States' case law through Ker2 6 and Frisbie7 until
Alvarez Machain,28 or by the Israeli's Eichmann case.29 In those cases
a legitimate right was invoked to justify an irregular capture of the
accused. On the same line of reasoning we may understand being in
accordance with international law a prosecution based on universal
jurisdiction having the only point of contact with the perpetrated crime
the accused's presence in the forum State. If we are in agreement with
this last statement, then the I.C J. decision can be seen to balance its
wide recognition of official immunity of Government officers, while
maintaining alive the main objective of prosecuting human rights
violators wherever they are.
A. Immunity in International Law Instruments
In spite of the Court's argument regarding the absence of
conventional texts explicitly granting immunity, and its recognition of
an international customary norm, there are many provisions in
international instruments refusing to recognize such immunity. The
dismissal by the I.C.J. of these norms looks to be not only frustrating
but unfounded as a brief summary will show.
Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter for the International Military
Tribunal declares:
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not
be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.3 °
25. Compare with Marina Spinedi, La Responsabilit6 de 1'Atat pur 'crime':
une responsabilit6 pinale?, in Droit International Pnal 93-114 (H. Ascensio, E.
Decaux, & A. Pellet eds., 2000).
26. Kerv. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225 (1886).
27. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952).
28. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
29. Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (1962).
30. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East available at
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Furthermore, Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East3' provides under the title
"Responsibility of Accused" that neither the official position, at any
time, of an accused, shall, of itself, be sufficient to free him from
responsibility for any crime. However, it may be considered for
mitigation of punishment.32
It also emerges from the spirit of the Nuremberg Charter that
anyone who violates a law of war may not demand immunity because
he or she was acting pursuant to a governmental order or a State
authority. If such were the case, the concerned State itself should be
regarded as having infringed its own competence as established by
international law.
The Military Tribunal decisions were ratified at the United Nations
first General Assembly by Resolution 1/95, 33 and reaffirmed later by
the so called "Principles of Nuremberg. ' '34 Principle III provided that
even if a person, who committed a crime under international law, had
acted as Head of State or as a responsible Government official, that
fact does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
These Principles were further reaffirmed by a contemporaneous ruling
on Article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide: 35
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.36
The same idea was supported by Article 3 of the Draft Code of
Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind37 and reappeared
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
31. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
32. Id.
33. UNG.A. Res. A/1/95 (1946) 11 Dec. 1946.
34. U.N.G.A. Res. 177 (II). Compare with Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, Part V, Doc. A/l 316 (1950). After a request
of the 1947 U.N. General Assembly, the International Law Commission elaborated
those Principles between June and July 1950, as a kind of codification of the
Military Tribunal conclusions and the main legal directives contained in the
Nuremberg Charter.
35. 78 U.N.T.S. 277,280. See http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/ts2 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2003).
36. Id.
37. Article 3: "The fact that a person acted as Head of State or as responsible
government official does not relieve him ofresponsibility for committing any of the
offences defined in this Code." Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security ofMankind, 1954, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offfra.htm
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as a recognized principle in Resolution 1989/65 of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC):38
19.... Superiors, officers or other public officials may be
held responsible for acts committed by officials under their
authority if they had a reasonable opportunity to prevent such
acts. In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or
other public emergency, shall blanket immunity from
prosecution be granted to any person allegedly involved in
extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions.'
Those principles were endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 44/159 of 15 December 198940 and by the 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind when
the latter ruled on official position and responsibility in Article 7;
The official position of an individual who commits a crime
against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as
head of State or Government, does not relieve him of
criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.42
The same principle appears in the Statutes of both ad hoc
International Tribunals43 and in the Rome Statute.44 The latter
(last visited Feb. 25, 2003). The fact that a person acted as Head of State or as the
responsible government official does not relieve him of responsibility for
committing any of the offences defined in this Code. See 1954 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, Vol. I, 137, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1954d and Vol. II, 119, U.N.
Doc.AICN.4/85.
38. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions, E.S.C. res. 1989/65, annex, 1989 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989), available at http://wwwl.unm.
edu/humanrts/instree/auoi.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
39. Id.
40. Summary of arbitrary executions, U.N.G.A., 82nd plen. mtg., Doc.
A/RES/44/159, available at http://www.un.org/docunents/ga/res/44/a44r/159.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
41. See http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htn (last visited Feb. 25,
2003).
42. Id.
43. Article 7(2) from the Amended Statute of the International Tribunal for
Yugoslavia and Article 6(2) from the Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda. Both identical texts declared: "The official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of state or government or as a responsible Government
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment." See http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm(last visited Feb.
25,2003) andhttp://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.htrnl (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
44. See http://www.un.org/icc (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
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declares in Article 27 under the heading "Irrelevance of official
capacity:"
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State, or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elective representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to
the official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.45
At this point it may be appropriate to underline that a clear consensus
in the international community seems to have been reached on the
principle of not allowing impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes
against international law. In those cases immunity based on their
status as a government official should be lifted. In the pertinent parts
of paragraph 60 of the Yerodia decision the I.C.J. adverts that:
... immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers
for Foreign Affairs, does not mean that they enjoy impunity in
respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective
of their gravity .... Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offenses; it
cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all
criminal responsibility.
Immunity is not equivalent to impunity. Immunity may shield a
person for a restricted period or in relation with certain acts, but it does
not mean a wide bill of impunity.
B. Immunity in International Case Law
During the hearings of the Yerodia case one Belgian counselor
admitted as undeniable "that examples of criminal proceedings
brought by a State against a sitting Minister are not legion."'46 In fact,
45. Id.
46. Oral hering avi/ab/eatitp'J/wwijci.o~rg/' j/' BEivODB~Fimal.
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besides the failed prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm H after World War
I, historically the first precedents were those arising in the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Military Trials, followed after nearly 50 years later by
Pinochet. The Pinochet case has undeniably started a new era on this
subject in international law.47
In Nuremberg the Military Tribunal concluded that the authors of
the alleged crimes could not shelter themselves behind their official
position to avoid punishment in appropriate proceedings.48 The Far
East Tribunal decision was based on a similar Charter as Nuremberg,
although its result was different. Specifically, it failed to indict the
Japanese Emperor and used a more restrictive formulation of the
concept of crimes against humanity (e.g. not including religious
persecution). In order to find other cases related to criminal
prosecution of persons enjoying an official position we need to come
to Pinochet and the recent International ad hoc Tribunals case law.
Certainly, it must be recognized that exists an impressive list of
cases pro and against official immunity, but they relate to torts handled
in civil proceedings. Many of these cases are cited by both immunity
supporters and their adversaries. Arguments used by the parties in
those cases were introduced during the Pinochet and the Yerodia
hearings.
A brief case law survey will show the confrontation. The
justification of absolute state immunity is discussed by Chief Justice
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in the already cited decision of
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon;49 the similar 1848 Lord
Chancellor ruling in The Duke of Brunswick v. The King of
Hannover;"0 and in the 1876 New York Supreme Court decision in
(Last visited February 25, 2003).
47. United Kingdom House of Lords: Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner
of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302
(1998); United Kingdom High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division: In re
Augusto Pinochet Ugarle, 38 I.L.M. 68 (1999); United Kingdom Home
Secretary: Response of Her Majesty's Government Regarding the Spanish
Extradition Request, 38 I.L.M. 489 (1999). See
http://www.parliament.thestatione...99899/ldjudgmnt/jd981125/pinoOl.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003) and tap.ccta.gov.uk/courtserv (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
48. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41
Am. J. Int'l L. 172 (1947).
49. See supra note 7.
50. 81 Rev. Rep. 1 (1848).
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Hatch v. Baez,5 upheld in 1982 in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v.
Hammer;52 in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic;53
the U.S. Supreme Court in Saudia Arabia v. Nelson;54 and in the Swiss
Federal Tribunal decision in Marcos and Marcos v. Federal
Department of Police." This list demonstrates that judicial decisions
maintaining an immunity shield in cases of individuals exercising a
recognized official position are numerous. On the other hand, cases
where immunity was rejected because the tortious act was understood
as a private illegal act or a discretionary function not allowing
immunity, also is impressive: Since Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala5 6 where
jurisdiction was assumed under the 1789 Alien Tort Statute; and later
continuing with the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in
Letelier v. Republic of Chile,57 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 58
Von Dardel v. USSR,59 Forti v. Suarez-Mason,6 Trajano v. Marcos,6'
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,62 Xuncax v. Gramajo,63
Cabiri v. Assasie-Gimah;6 and finally before Pinochet, the decision
of the International ad hoc Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Anto
Furundzja.65 A closer look shows that there is no conclusive answer
concerning immunity for Heads of State and other officers for acts
performed while enjoying official positions. However, a questioning
about the proper meaning of this ambivalence is unavoidable.
During Pinochet this fluctuation brought Lord Saville to sustain
that while immunity will continue being granted in civil litigation
regardless the conduct of the tortious offender, in criminal proceedings
51. 7 Hun. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876).
52. 1982 App. Cas. 888.
53. Arnerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73,77
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct.
683 (1989).
54. 507 U.S. 349, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
55. Marcos & Marcos v. Fed. Dep't of Police [1989] 102 I.L.R. 198.
56. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
58. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
60. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
61. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. 886 F. Supp. 162 (Mass. 1995).
64. 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
65. Case 1T-95-17/1-Trial Chamber of the ICTY, 153 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzij a/appeal/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
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Heads of State and other prominent officials may be held accountable
without the prospect that the immunity shield will cover their
behavior."
For example, in 1990 in Manuel Noriega,67 the defacto Head of
State of Panama was prosecuted for conspiring to introduce drugs into
the U.S. Noriega's immunity claim failed under the fixed American
standard of requiring consultation with the Executive Branch prior to
the recognition of immunity. The American Government, by pursuing
Noriega's capture and prosecution, clearly manifested its opinion that
Noriega should be denied Head of State immunity.
However, it was in Pinochet when the first former Head of State
was confronted in the domestic court of a foreign State with a criminal
accusation for acts perpetrated during the time he was in office in his
country. This situation produced an uncommon confrontation. On one
side, the traditional common law doctrine supporting immunity in
respect of crimes committed by a Head of State or somebody in
exercise of official function; and on the other side, the position that
sustains that individuals must be taken as accountable for perpetrating
international law crimes regardless of their official situation when the
crime was committed.68
In Pinochet the judges accepted that the prohibition of torture had
been elevated to the hierarchy of imperative law, ius cogens, and at
this rank it was an absolute value from which nobody must deviate,
imposing as consequence to all states which finds a torturer within
their territories,'either to prosecute him or to extradite him. But in no
way could an order from a public authority be invoked as justification
of torture, nor could a national measure condone it or leave its
perpetrators with any sort of impunity. As it was stated by Lord Millet
... International law cannot be supposed to have a established
a crime having the character of ius cogens and at the same time
to have provided an immunity which is coextensive with the
obligation it seeks to impose.69
66. See supra note 42, par. 295-298.
67. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affid, 117
F.3d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1997).
68. See Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case,
10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 2, 237 (1999).
69. See 38 I.L.M. 581, 651 (1999).
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Also, in Furundzja the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia stated a similar reasoning:
140... As the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
put it in general terms: 'Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provision of international law be enforced' ... Individuals are
personally responsible, whatever their official position, even
if they are heads of State or government ministers: Article 7(2)
of the Statute and article 6(2) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda... are indisputably declaratory
of customary international law.7"
Another example of an indictment of a Head of State in power is
involved Slobodan Milosevic who was still in office as President of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when he was indicted on
24 May 1999 by the Prosecutor of the Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.
It seems that international law cannot recognize immunity for those
acts that on the other side it condemns. It will therefore be difficult to
understand that international law recognizes the prohibition of certain
hideous crimes as paramount, rising to the level of ius cogens but on
the other side accepts a shield of sovereign immunity in cases where
the perpetrator holds an official position. Consequently, in cases
where we speak of practices amounting to one of those categories of
crimes against international law, such violations should not be covered
by State immunity.7'
V. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The Yerodia decision touched on this topic by refusing to
recognize the purest form of universal jurisdiction as a norm of
70. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1 -T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
Dec. 10, 1998, 140, 38, I.L.M. 346-47 (1999), also available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzij a/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
71. Compare with Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law
Under the F.S.I.A. and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 Va. J. Int'l L. 191 (1983).
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customary international law. The main decision and some of the
judges' separate opinions attempted, by looking at international
conventions, treaties and contemporary case law, to determine how far
universal jurisdiction was recognized in modem international law. In
spite of the conciseness of the decision's paragraph outlining this
problem, it appears to have been the real core of the case because of
its significance for the future development of international criminal
law. Consequently, it is necessary to review the main points referred
to by both the decision and the judges' separate opinions and to
compare them to other conventions and case law relating to the
subject.
A. Treaties and Conventions
Some of the separate opinions recalled that the 1958 U.N. Geneva
Convention on the High Seas" included the only cases of universal
jurisdiction recognized by international customary law. Accordingly,
Article 13 declares that every State shall adopt effective measures to
prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships under its flag," and
Article 19 stipulates that:
.. . on the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or
aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.
The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may
decide upon the penalties to be imposed .... .'
This principle using identical language appears in Articles 99 and
105 of the Montego Bay Convention of 1982.75
In their common separate opinion, Judges Higgins, Buergenthal
and Kooijmans understood that the loose use of language confounded
the obligatory territorial jurisdiction, which happens when a State
detains an alleged perpetrator of crimes against international law
72. 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF, 62/122. See also 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), and
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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found in its territory, with the treaty-based extraterritorial
jurisdiction as outlined in the above mentioned Conventions. But as
we will see, the meaning of the universal jurisdiction concept goes
beyond both these alternatives.
Supervinient Conventions assimilate the duty to extradite or to
prosecute, internationally known by the Latin expression "aut dedere
aut prosequi" or "aut dedere aut iudicare."76 Thereby, the U.N.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in New York in 196 1,"
in Article 36(a)(iv) refers to:
Serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by
nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in
whose territory the offence was committed, or by the Party in
whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not
acceptable in conformity with the law of the Party to which
application is made, and if such offender has not alreadybeen
prosecuted and judgement given.78
Judge Guillaume regarded the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft or Hague Convention of 16 December
1970'9 as the first significant change in the 1970s. Article 4
paragraph 2 recognizes:
Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence
in the case where the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to
any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.8"
This text works as a pivotal turning point since after it, the duty
to prosecute should not be understood as conditioned to the existence
of jurisdiction. On the contrary, jurisdiction may be established in
order to prosecute after the offender is found within the territory.
The premise "prosecute or extradite" has been followed by a
considerable amount of international agreements. Here we should
mentioned the "Montreal Convention" or Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,8
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances signed in Vienna 21
76. CherifM. Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere, Aut Judicare-The
Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law 22-25 (1995).
77. 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
78. Id.
79. 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
80. Id.
81. 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
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February 1971,82 the New York Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents signed 14 December 1973,3 the New
York Convention against the Taking of Hostages signed 17 December
1979, 84 the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material from 3 March 1980,5 the U.N. Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from
10 December 1984,6 the Montreal Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation from 24 February 1988,7 the Rome Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation from 10 March 1988,8 the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, 9 the U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances from 19 December
1988,90 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
82. 1019 U.N.T.S. 175.
Serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by nationals or
by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the
offence was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is
found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the
Party to which application is made, and if such offender has not already
been prosecuted and judgement given.
Art. 22 § 2 (a)(iv).
83. 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; 13 I.L.M. 41(1974).
84. 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
85. 1456 U.N.T.S. 101; T.I.A.S. 11080; 18I.L.M. 1422 (1979).
86. G.A. Res 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/5, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
87. 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
88. 974 U.N.T.S. 177; 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).
89. 1678 U.N.T.S. 201.
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to
any of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in
accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
Art. 3 par. 4.
90. 1696 U.N.T.S. 449. Entered into force 11 Nov. 1990.
Without prejudice to the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established
in accordance with its domestic law, a Party in whose territory an alleged
offender is found shall:
(a) If it does not extradite him in respect of an offence established in
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, on the grounds set forth in
article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a), submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless
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Bombings from 15 December 1997,9' and finally, the New York
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism from 9
December 1999.92
In addition to these international multilateral instruments, the
principle was also accepted by some regional agreements. For
example, the "Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance," signed at the third special session
of the General Assembly of the O.A.S., in Washington, 2 February
1971.9' Article 5 of this Convention declares:
When extradition requested for one of the crimes specified in
Article 2 is not in order because the person sought is a national
of the requested state, or because of some other legal or
constitutional impediment, that state is obliged to submit the
case to its competent authorities for prosecution, as if the act
had been committed in its territory ....
The same principle appears in Article 6 paragraph 1 of the
"European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," signed at
Strasbourg, 27 January 1977,9' and was reaffirmed by different
Declarations and Resolutions from organs of the United Nations. For
otherwise agreed with the requesting Party;
(b) If it does not extradite him in respect of such an offence and has
established its jurisdiction in relation to that offence in accordance
with article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph (b), submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless
otherwise requested by the requesting Party for the purposes of
preserving its legitimate jurisdiction.
Article 6. par. 9.
91. UN Doc. A/RES/52/1 64 available at
http://ue.eu.int/ejn/data/vol-c/9_autres-textes/terrorismen.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2003).
92. UNDoc. A/RES/54/109 availableathttp://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm.
93. 1438 U.N.T.S. 24 381. Also available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-49.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
94. See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/htn/O90.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2003). The text declares:
Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over an offence mentioned in Article 1 in the case
where the suspected offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him after receiving a request for extradition from a Contracting
State whose jurisdiction is based on a rule ofjurisdiction existing equally
in the law of the requested State.
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instance in G. A. Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) from 3 December 19739"
the principle was already present within the fifth paragraph:
5. Persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity shall be
subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a general
rule in the countries in which they committed those crimes. In
that connection, States shall co-operate on questions of
extraditing such persons.
Article 14 of Resolution 47/13396 of the U.N.G.A. from 18
December 1992 declares:
Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced
disappearance in a particular State shall, when the facts
disclosed by an official investigation so warrant, be brought
before the competent civil authorities of that State for the
purpose of prosecution and trial unless he has been extradited
to another State wishing to exercise jurisdiction in accordance
with the relevant international agreements in force. All States
should take any lawful and appropriate action available to
them to bring to justice all persons presumed responsible for
an act of enforced disappearance, who are found to be within
their jurisdiction or under their control.
These international instruments give very explicit guidance to
States when any person presumed to have perpetrated any conduct
prohibited by the relevant instruments is found within the State. In
such a case, the State in whose territory such a person was arrested,
has the duty to prosecute or to extradite him or her to another requiring
State. Despite this premise, as we have already seen, the I.C.J.
decision affirmed that the existence of the above does not necessarily
indicate the existence of a recognized pure universal jurisdiction
without any link with the forum State. Besides those cases accepted
95. See Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest,
extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, adopted by General Assembly resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 Dec. 1973,
28 UN GAOR sup. (30A) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 Add. 1 (1973) available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/htnl/menu3/b/pextrad.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
96. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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by the decision, after recalling that immunity is not equivalent to
impunity, it must be concluded that for the I.C.J. a wide and generous
universal jurisdiction, such as the prior Belgian law, does not seem to
be part of international mandatory law today. This latter premise
cannot be challenged by revisiting either former or recent
jurisprudence relating to universal jurisdiction.
B. Case law
In its written submission Belgium relied on dicta from the 1927
Lotus case for support of its interpretation of universal jurisdiction."
In that case the Permanent Court of Justice declared:
. . . Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by
international law upon a State is that-failing the existence of
a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another State. In this
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised
by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive
rule derived from international custom or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits
a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and which it cannot rely on some permissive rule
of international law. . . . Far from laying down a general
prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them
in this respect a wide measure of discretion ....
In addition, in Pinochet,9" mentioned in the Yerodia decision, the
related opinions where more orientated toward determining immunity
limitations rather than the recognition of universal jurisdiction. The
case was seized upon a prior conventional recognition of the
corresponding international law principle as required by British law,
rather than the acceptance of universal jurisdiction itself. This
97. Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), at 18-19.
98. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police and Others-Ex parte Pinochet,
37 I.L.M. 1302 (1998), 38 I.L.M. 68 (1999) and 38 I.L.M. 489 (1999).
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requirement hinged on the temporal limitation of the British
ratification to the U.N. Torture Convention. However, this case
implied the explicit acceptance that an individual in an official
position can be held responsible for international crimes. Likewise it
distinguished between acts of a State organ which could be understood
to simply be illegal, from those considered to be crimes against
international law. The latter habilitates universal jurisdiction and
impedes invoking immunity ratione materiae before international
tribunals and in certain cases, also before domestic courts.99
The 1991 Polyukhovich case 00 also analyzed and accepted the
universal jurisdiction concept when it ordered prosecution of a war
criminal. However, the tribunal by a majority decision, turned the
charges down invoking the ex post facto prohibition. In
Nulyarimma,10 ' also cited by the Polyukhovich judges in their joint
separate opinion, the Australian Supreme Court decided a claim
against the Prime Minister and other high ranking officers who were
accused of issuing a law understood as against Aboriginal's land and
traditions. The occasion was used to introduce a claim of genocide
perpetrated 200 years ago. The Court recognized genocide as opening
universal jurisdiction but noted domestic legislation should be drafted
first. The opening hearings, surrounded by much drama, were a
significant move toward the approval of the 1999 Australian Genocide
Act. 102
The Cvjetkovic case 103 was also mentioned in the Polyukhovich
joint separate opinion. Cvjetkovic was the first case related to the
Balkans conflict to rely on universal jurisdiction. The Prosecutor
affirmed Austrian jurisdiction when a crime perpetrated in a foreign
country fulfills the double criminality principle. The defendant was
acquitted because of errors in the proceedings.
99. Bianchi, supra note 69.
100. Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth of Australia and Another (1991) 172
C.L.R. 501.
101. Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999) FCA 1192. See
http://www.law.mq.edu.au/Units/law309/nulyarinma.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2003).
102. See http://www.law.mq.edu.au/Units/law309/antigenocide.htm#bill (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003).
103. Austria g. Cvjetkovic, Oberster Gerichtshof Vienna. See
http://www.redress.org/publications/unjeur.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2003).
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In Bouterse, ° a powerful army official was tried crimes
committed in Surinam in 1982. The army official was accused of
murdering fifteen persons but the crime had no visible ties to
Holland. Nevertheless, the Dutch Supreme Court recognized that
torture is an international crime open to universal jurisdiction. The
only prerequisite demanded by the Court was the accused's presence
in Dutch territory. However, in the Report for the Council of Europe
after its ratification of the Rome Statute Holland recognized that a
new law text had been prepared and introduced in Parliament and
was awaiting approval.'05
C. Other Judicial Decisions
There are some interesting cases which date back to World War
II, wherejuridical support habilitating thejurisdiction of the military
tribunal or commission in question was universal jurisdiction and
was not mentioned in the Yerodia decision or in the separate
opinions. It can be doubted, however, that their inclusion would
have changed in any way the I.C.J. opinion.
In Lothar Eisentrager°6 the American Military Commission
denied the defendant's lack of jurisdiction argument, based on his
status as a German citizen with residence in the Chinese territory.
The defendant argued the case was controlled by Chinese law. The
American Military Commission, in a remarkable decision, sustained:
A war crime ... is not a crime against the law or criminal
code of any individual nation, but a crime against the ius
gentium. The laws and usages of war are of universal
application, and do not depend for their existence upon
national laws and frontiers. Arguments to the effect that only
a sovereign of the locus criminis has jurisdiction and that
only the lex loci can be applied, are therefore without any
foundation.107
104. ReBouterse, 18 September2001. See http://www.rechtspraak.nl/flashed.asp
(last visited Aug. 15, 2003). Original version is cited as AB1471 (Rechtspraak.nl).
105. Cf Consult/ICC (2001) 21, 19 July 2001.
106. See In re Eisentrager, 14 L. Rep. of Trials of War Criminals 8 (1949).
107. Id.
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Likewise, in Wilhelm List"°8 the Military Tribunal in Nuremberg
sustained:
An international crime is such an act universally recognized as
criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international
concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control over
it under ordinary circumstances.' °9
Both citations were mentioned in Polyukhovich,"° discussed
earlier in this paper. In addition, inAlstoetter.. the American Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg, in response to the question of universality
concerning punishment of war crimes, declared:
This universality and superiority of international law does not
necessarily imply universality of its enforcement. As to the
punishment of persons guilty of violating the laws and customs
of war (war crimes in the narrow sense), it has always been
recognized that tribunals may be established and punishment
imposed by the State into whose hands the perpetrators fall.
Those rules of international law were recognized as
paramount, and jurisdiction to enforce them by the injured
belligerent government, whether within the territorial
boundaries of the State or in occupied territory, has been
unquestioned." 2
In Alfons Klein, also known as the Hadamar Trial,"3 the
defendants stood accused of having participated in murders committed
in an extermination center. Here for the first time, a point of contact
was clearly required as a prerequisite for access to universal
jurisdiction. The Military Commission addressed whether it could
108. Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, 8 L. Rep. of Trial sof War Criminals 34,
54(1948). Also available athttp://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/Listl.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2003).
109. Id.
110. Polyukhovich, supra note 100.
111. 14 Ann. Dig. 278, 282-83 (U.S. Military Trib. 1947) (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 1 (1942) and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct.
640 (1946).
112. Id.
113. Trial of Alfons Klein and six others, 1 L. Rep. of Trials of War Criminals
46 (1945). Also available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/had amar.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003).
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assume jurisdiction despite the fact that all crimes were committed by
foreigners outside American frontiers and that the victims were also
foreigners. The Commission decided the question in the affirmative,
basing its jurisdiction on three main principles:
(a) the general doctrine recently expounded and called
'universality of jurisdiction over war crimes,' which has
the support of the United Nations War Crimes
Commission and according to which every independent
State has, under International Law, jurisdiction to punish
not only pirates but also war criminals in its custody,
regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the place
where the offence was committed, particularly where, for
some reason, the criminal would otherwise go unpunished.
(b) the narrower theory that the United States did have a direct
interest in punishing the perpetrators of the offence
inasmuch as the victims were nationals of allies engaged in
a common struggle against a common enemy;
(c) the assumption of supreme authority in Germany by the
four great Powers through the Declaration of Berlin, dated
5th June, 1945, the United States being the local sovereign
in the United States zone of occupation and deriving
jurisdiction both from the principle of territoriality and
from the principle of personality, the accused being
German nationals.' 4
After World War II, the case of Adolf Eichmann.. was also
concerned with the issue of jurisdiction. It may be questionable
whether it was a pure exercise of personal jurisdiction because Israel
subsidiarily recognized it had an emergent right to prosecute. The
Tribunal was confronted with accusations against Eichmann as
perpetrator of crimes against humanity for acts committed even before
the existence of Israel. The Tribunal decided that:
12. The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are crimes not
under Israeli law alone. These crimes which offended the
whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are
114. Id.
115. Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 39 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem
1961).
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grave offences against the law of nations itself ("delicta juris
gentium"). Therefore, far from international law negating or
limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to such
crimes, in the absence of an International Court, the
international law is in need of the judicial and legislative
authorities of every country, to give effect to its penal
injunctions and to bring criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to
try crimes under international law is universal."l 6
These conclusions were reaffirmed when the Tribunal considered
its jurisdiction in relation to the crime of genocide according to Article
VI of the Genocide Convention." 7 The Court stated:
25 ... It is clear that the reference in Article 6 to territorial
jurisdiction, apart from the jurisdiction of the non-existent
international tribunal, is not exhaustive, and every sovereign
state may exercise its existing powers within the limits of
customary international law, and there is nothing in the
adherence of a state to the Convention to waive powers which
are not mentioned in Article 6.118
Israel's right to prosecute Eichmann, according to this position,
derived from a twofold source: first, from the universal right to
prosecute crimes of this type which belongs to mankind as such; and
second, the specific right of the State of Israel to prosecute anyone
who jeopardizes'its existence, Israel having been a victim itself. In
relation to Nazi war criminals, Israel's right to prosecute was
established in the Foundational Act of the State of Israel. According
to cases decided before Eichmann, Israel attributed to itself complete
competence to decide cases related to crimes perpetrated by any
member of the German National Socialist Party.
116. Covey Oliver, Jurisdiction oflsrael to Try Eichmann-International Law in
Relationship to the Israeli Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 56 An.J.Int'l.L.
(1962) 805-845.
117. Article VI declares
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.
UNTS No 1021, Vol. 78 (1951), p. 277, available at




Another important case took place in Canada where Jewish
deportations from Hungary during War World II were investigated.
The Canadian Supreme Court admitted that a State can exercise
jurisdiction over a individual founded within its borders without
consideration of the place where the crime was committed." 9
However the accused was acquitted on other grounds.
In Europe a similar development took place. On 25 November
1994 the Danish Supreme Court condemned Refic Saric, for violations
of international humanitarian law when he engaged in violent acts
against Croatian prisoners detained in the Bosnian detention center of
Dretelj. 2° Saric was a Bosnian Muslim who helped his Croatian
captors persecute his fellows prisoners. Danish doctors declared Saric
as mentally ill in spite of reports about his perfect health when he
punished his fellow prisioners. He was sentenced to eight years in
prison to be carried out in a specialized institution, after which he
would be deported. The Danish jurisdiction was based in the Geneva
Conventions together with Article 8.5 of the Danish Penal Code. In
September 1995 the Danish Supreme Court ratified the verdict.
A German tribunal judged Novislav Djajic on 23 May 1997.2
The tribunal declared Djajic not guilty of the charge of participating in
the crime of genocide but guilty of being co-author of fourteen
murders. He was sentenced to five years in prison. This conviction
was the first in Germany related to crimes committed during the
Balkan conflict. Germanjurisdiction was based on a specific statutory
provision on the crime of genocide in the German Penal Code § 220 '
StGB, and on the fact that the General Prosecutor of the ad hoc
International Tribunal did not request deferral as had happen in earlier
cases.
Furthermore, in April 1997 a Swiss Military Tribunal, invoking the
principle of universal jurisdiction, acquitted a Yugoslavian citizen
accused of having participated in crimes committed in the Omarska
and Keraten Bosnian concentration camps.' And, in France on 6
January 1998, the French Cour de Cassation, under universal
119. Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
120. Rafalle Maison, Les premiers cas d'application des dispositions pinales
des Convention de Gdneve par les jurisdictions internes, 6 Eur. J. Int'l L. 260
(1995). Compare with Public Prosecutor against N.N., High Court (Ostre
Landsrets) 3d Division, 25 Nov. 1994.
121. Staatsanwaltg. NovislavDjajic, BayerischesOberstes LG, 23.5.1997, 1998
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 392, commented in Christoph Safferling, 92 Arn.
J. Int'l L. 528 (1998).
122. In re G, Tribunal Militaire, Div. 1, Lausanne, Switzerland, 18 Apr. 1997,
commented in 92 Am. J. Int'l. L. 78 (1998).
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jurisdiction, decided Munyeshayaka,2 3 where a Rwandan priest,
domiciled in France, was prosecuted for crimes of genocide and crimes
against humanity.
On 30 April 1999, the German Bundesgerichtshof ratified a
decision of a Dusseldorf Tribunal which sentenced Nikola Jorgic 24 to
life imprisonment for the crime of genocide, thereby confirming
German Tribunals had jurisdiction according to the Genocide
Convention. It declared as sufficient point of contact the fact that the
convict had resided several years in Germany where he was also
arrested.
Finally, and ratifying the existence of a point of contact, the
International ad hoc Tribunal in Furundzjia,'25 referred to criminal
responsibily on an individual level and established that:
• . . it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus
cogens character bestowed by the international community
upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to
investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite [an] individual
accused of torture, who [is] present in a territory under its
jurisdiction.'26
From the above mentioned jurisprudence emerges a clear trend
toward the recognition of universal jurisdiction, although it would be
fair to accept that generally a point of contact was always required. A
wide and pure universal jurisdiction, as maintained by Belgium in
Yerodia, does not have any precedent.
D. Doctrine
Despite the failure to recognize the existence of universal
jurisdiction as a specific international compulsory principle, the main
decision and the separate opinions declared that clear evidence exists
123. Webceslas Munyeshyaka case, Cour de Cassation, Paris, 6 Jan. 1998, 102
Revue Gingrale de Droit International Public (1998). See also Brigitte Stern, 93
Am. J. Int'l L. 525 (1999).
124. See http://www.preventgenocide.org/de/bestrafung/nikolajorgic.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003).





of a trend in that sense. Thus, in addition to the Belgian law, the Max
Planck Institute of Freiburg Project, which was recently approved by
the German Parliament, must be cited. This so called "code of
international criminal law" Volkerstrafgesetzbuch, abbreviated VstGB,
establishes in its first Article:
This Act shall apply to all criminal offences against
international law designated under this Act, to serious criminal
offences designated therein even when the offence was
committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany.'27
Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert also referred to the monumental
work of Amnesty International in September 2001. Specifically
Amnesty International compiled, in a compact disk, legislation from
more than 120 countries related to the way domestic legislation
introduces the concept of universal jurisdiction. 128 The Final Report
of the I.L.A. London 2000129 meeting, and the work of the N.G.O.
REDRESS are also mentioned. 30
Another recent document must be cited because of its significance
coming from a gathering of representatives of proponents of the purest
form of universal jurisdiction, and because of the quality of their
scholarship. It brought together members of the United Nations,
university professors and practicioners under the auspices of the Law
and Public Affairs Program of the University of Princeton, the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the
International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute of
Human Rights and the Dutch Institute of Human Rights. They met in
January 2001 and after several working sessions produced what is
called "The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction." '' The
authors of these Principles recognized that they contain lege lata and
127. See http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/l 1222.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) and the publication of the Max-Planck Institute, available at
http://www.iuscrimn.mpg.de/forsch/onlinepub.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
128. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction. The Duty ofStates to Enact
and Implement Legislation, Al Index IOR 53/2001.
129. Compare with http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Hunan%20Rights%2OLaw
/HumanRig.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
130. Seesupra note 103.
131. Compare http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/univejur.pdf (last visted Mar.
22, 2003) and Doug Kassel, The World Reaches Out of Justice, The Chi. Trib.,
Dec. 8, 2001. See also http://www.commondreams.org/views0 1/0812-04.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003).
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de legeferenda elements. Their objective is to be a guide which could
help law makers prepare legislation that implements those principles
in domestic law. When drafting the Principles, the question emerged
whether the moment and circumstances were appropriate in order to
bring greater clarity to the universal jurisdiction question, or whether
they should wait until a more convenient moment so as not to
prematurely determine the rules.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Yerodia decision produced a strong current of sympathy
and support for the Belgian position from many human right
organizations and scholars. However, it is now clear that the decision
declares an international position which is understood as operative
today and it seems less than probable that the Belgian example will
propagate in other countries.
While expressing my sympathy to the valiant movement initiated
in Belgium, I also share the opinion that the acceptance of a broad in
absentia universal jurisdiction seems more likely to be an objective in
international law yet to be reached.
Nonetheless, attention must be called to the loose use of the term
"universal jurisdiction." It shows a certain confusion even among
legal scholars. In Argentina, for example, this confusion was further
spread by the Argentine Government through resolutions taken by the
Executive branch. The objective of those resolutions was to impede
extradition procedures against former members of the Armed Forces
relating to crimes committed during the 1976-1983 dictatorship. Thus,
the Argentine authorities publicly declared that the country belongs to
those which give priority to territorial jurisdiction, and they refuse the
so called "extraterritorial" theory. This is a serious mistake. Argentina
had subscribed, among others, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
its Protocols and to the 1984 U.N. Torture Convention which
expressly recognized the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction as
already explained in this paper.
If we speak on universal jurisdiction we must realize that it has
nothing to do with the British Pinochet case or with any other
extradition requests based on human rights violations committed by
former military rulers and invoking the victim's citizenship. Universal
[Vol. 63
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jurisdiction does not mean either the legal principle to prosecute or to
extradite as was understood by many scholars. It was prevented in the
already cited common separate opinion of Judges Buergenthal,
Higgins and Kooijmans. 3 2 Pure universal jurisdiction, in essence, is
similar to the Yerodia decision's so called "in absentia" jurisdiction,
and will take into consideration only the nature of the crime in order
to be qualified as such. We reference neither the citizenship of the
perpetrator or victim nor the circumstance of being physically in the
forum State territory. This principle, and not its variations, is the one
the I.C.J. decision did not recognize as compulsory international law.
132. Compare par. 41 separate opinion.
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